INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS AS A MATTER OF SECURITY: OPEN DOOR POLICY AND SYRIANS IN TURKEY

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Abstract

International migration, an issue as old as the history itself, needs to be tabled. The Syrian conflict which happened due to the Arab Spring led millions of Syrians to leave their country. The wave of uncontrolled immigration, starting from the neighbouring ones and spreading to various countries, became an important tool for terrorists to infiltrate into target countries and caused a serious security problem for migrant-hosting states. Additionally, this human flow has led to changes in the demographic structures of the hosting countries, and these changes have brought many social and economic costs that threaten the internal security. In this context; in Turkey, who applied open door policy for the people fleeing from the humanitarian crisis in Syria from the very first days, issues caused by Syrians in time are quite attention grabbing. An in-depth analysis of these events reveals the relationship between illegal and irregular migration and considerable increase in terrorist activities, social, political and economic costs and demographic changes.

Keywords: *International Migrants, Border, Security, Open Door Policy, Terror Attacks, Syrian, Turkey.*

GÜVENLİK KONUSU OLARAK ULUSLARARASI GÖÇMENLER: AÇIK KAPI POLİTİKASI VE TÜRKİYE'DE Kİ SURİYELİLER

Öz

Tarihin kendisi kadar eski olan uluslararası göç, ele alınması gereken önemli konulardan biridir. Arap Baharı'nın etkisiyle Suriye'de ortaya çıkan iç çatışma, milyonlarca Suriyelinin ülkelerini terk etmesine neden olmuştur. Kontrolsüz bir göç dalgası komşu ülkelerden başlayarak çeşitli ülkelere yayılmaya başlamış ve bu durum teröristlerin hedef ülkelere sızmaları için önemli bir araç haline gelerek göçmen barındıran ülkeler için ciddi bir güvenlik soruna dönüşmüştür. Ayrıca, bu insan akışı ev sahibi ülkelerin demografik yapılarında değişikliklere yol açmış ve bu değişiklikler iç güvenliği tehdit eden birçok sosyal ve ekonomik maliyet getirmiştir. Bu bağlamda, Suriye'deki insani krizden kaçanlara ilk günden itibaren açık kapı politikası uygulayan Türkiye'de, Suriyelilerin zaman içerisinde neden olduğu durum ve gelişmeler oldukça dikkat çekicidir. Bu olayların derinlemesine analizi, yasadışı ve düzensiz göçün; terörist faaliyetler, sosyal, politik ve ekonomik maliyetler ile demografik değişim arasındaki ilişkisini ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Uluslararası Göçmenler, Sınır, Güvenlik, Açık Kapı Politikası, Terör Saldırıları, Suriyeli, Türkiye.*

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INTRODUCTION

The individual or mass movement within or beyond territories is a very old phenomenon. This movement has deeply affected human communities in various time periods. It has its positive effects as well like contributing to the increase in income or as human resource. Walls were built throughout history to keep away unwanted people; though most of these walls had military and security purposes, they emerged as a result of human instincts to protect themselves, their lands and possessions from foreigners. Immigration is, therefore, mostly handled with its disadvantages due to this threat perception, although it has also advantageous sides.

Migration became a popular topic in the last century and especially after the Cold War. However, during the last decade, especially after Syrian crisis, the massive migration movements once again gained importance. The Arab Spring, which has spread to most of the Middle Eastern countries that have colonial past, has not only caused internal upheavals and regional conflicts, but also has led many people to flee from their country and seek asylum in the territories of other countries (Sayın et al., 2016: 5). Unlike other countries, the uprising in Syria has soon turned into a civil war and as a result, there aroused a massive upsurge in the number of refugee population. As of 5 January 2020, the number of the registered Syrians in other countries is 5,558,123, out of which, 3,576,369 are registered in Turkey (UNHCR, 2020). This number increases further when the unregistered ones are taken into account. Syria can therefore be shown as the country that led the most negative effects of the Arab Spring.

This wave of migration, reaching Europe and other continents, has brought the problem to a new dimension, especially for Syria's neighbours. For the hosting states, humanitarian dimension created by the asylum seekers who crossed the borders without any documents due to the 'Open Door Policy' has been transformed into a security dilemma. This uncontrolled wave of migration was, in a sense, a golden opportunity for the members of the terrorist groups to reach the target countries passing unnoticed along with these asylum seekers. In addition, the asylum seekers themselves have had their own potential to create social, financial or domestic safety problems that threaten the security of the society of which they become a part in economic, social and demographic terms.

Turkey is one such country which witnessed a phenomenal growth in security related issues after 2011. According to OECD statistics, Turkey is host to the highest number of people in need of international protection in the world for the fifth year in a row with over 3,6 million Syrians under temporary protection and

around 350,000 people from other countries (OECD, 2019). The Open Door Policy, launched under legal responsibility of international law and from the perspective of humanitarian approach by Turkey in 2011 has brought many problems with the passage of time. These vary from the attacks of terrorist organisations, financial issues and social issues that threaten the society. As Open Door Policy started in 2011 and *de facto* ended in 2016, data and cases are usually selected from this period in order to better describe the process from openness to constraints.

Keeping this in view, in this study, firstly the perception of migration and then the national security issue will be handled. Although there are many components of national security like environmental, economic, societal etc., all of which are specifically associated with the security of the state, in this study only internal and border security concepts will be handled under the umbrella of national security while public and societal security will be discussed as dimensions of internal security. In the study, internal security refers to the act of keeping peace and preventing violence within the borders of state (Grizold, 1994: 38) and used as a general meaning involving the public and societal security; public security alludes to protection of the citizens or institutions within a territory against any kind of threat to their well-being, and societal security indicates the sustainability within acceptable conditions for evolution of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and customs (Buzan et al. 1993: 43). As migration wave might consequently lead to security problems of such; risks and possibilities will be underlined in the light of evidences. While the impact of Syrian civil war and refugee crisis on Turkey's national security is analysed, Turkey's Open Door Policy will be considered under this conceptual framework. Finally, the refugee and security nexus will be overviewed. The first of these is border security, which includes the attacks of the terrorist groups entering the country through under-controlled borders. The second is the danger of internal security which indicates how demographic problems would and might cause a threat to national and public security. In short, immigration has challenges for the hosting states, both of which are equally important: humanitarian and security. This study seeks to reveal the connection between (un/under)controlled flow of immigrants from Syria and the national security, including demographic change, social, economic and political costs, crime rates and terrorist activities from a security perspective as recorded by Turkey.

1. INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The traditional concept of national security extracts its origins from a course of modernist political and sociological idea from Thomas Hobbes to Max Weber (Hobbes, 1909 and Weber, 1946), indicating that the state shall have the unconditional monopoly upon the legal use of coercion and that security is the basic responsibility of a nation-state (Fjäder, 2014:116-117). Based on this traditional view of national security, the *raison d'etre* of the nation-state is the insurance of security through professional units (like border security force, military force, law enforcement and paramilitary organisations) to deal with external and internal threats (Fjäder, 2014: 117).

The Peace of Westphalia, from which modern concepts of national security was derived, launched a system of nation-states having full sovereignty at both internal and external security. Since then, securing of the borders and the inside has been of great importance in establishing the national security and thus, "nation" and the "others" have been major centres of attention addressing security policies.

In order to establish large scale security measures, it is ideal to prevent threats before they cross the physical lines of the state: the borders. Throughout history, whether it is by legal means or not, the arrival of people from a region to another region has not always been welcomed by the people of that region. States have been building walls since the tenth millennium B.C. to keep the "others" out. From biblical Jericho to modern Mexico, walls have been erected in different purposes but to stop one or more things/groups; like terrorists, immigrants, armies, drugs, weapons, foreigners, undesired races and creeds and tribes, flood or other natural events; but predominantly the "people". The Romans built Hadrian's Wall to keep out their enemies and the Chinese built the Great Wall to protect themselves from rival nations (Fisher, 2019). Although this is an ancient idea, there is a widespread connection between past and today, which is the idea of keeping outsiders out (National Geographic, 2018). This hostility is supported by the increase in irregular and illegal migration as a result of events that have deeply affected the world, especially, since the beginning of the 21st century, and the incidents of terrorism and these events might cause more damage than thought.

The more the numbers of the immigrants become, the more related incidents and concerns of the insiders increase. When we look at general data, we see that; while the number of international migrants worldwide was 173 million in 2000, it reached to 248 million in 2015 following the Syrian civil war and it has reached to 272 million in 2019, which corresponds to 3.6% of the world population today,

and it is 2.5% more than the population growth rate of 1% (UN, 2019). It shows us the fact that the number of the international migrants worldwide has grown faster than the world's population (WB, 2019). In fact, international migration is more than these mathematical proportions; rather, it is a barometer that measures economic, social, and political status of both resource and target countries (Solimano, 2010: 23). When the events that have deeply affected the world in the 21st century are taken into consideration, the event best proves these observations is the Syrian Crisis that has affected many countries in various ways since March 2011.

When the Syrian crisis is analysed, it is seen that irregular migrants are forced migrants, leaving their lands due to reasons beyond their control. Turkey, having the longest land border with Syria, initially gave permission for the Syrians to pass the border in accordance with the Open Door Policy. They were under threat in Syria and accepted by Turkey without being asked for an identity card or a passport or any kind of legal or official documents as saving lives become a priority compared to other issues at emergencies. An asylum-seeker who had to flee from his country during the war proved the situation as follows: "In your country if there's a war, would you remember to carry the passport? Or you would you rather survive for yourself to run away from the situation?" (Innes, 2015: 41). Especially as in the case of Syria, the priority of these people, whose lives are endangered, were to flee from the threat first (Rittersberge-Tılıç, 2015: 19), the rest would become next from humanitarian perspective. However, from the security perspective, this situation had its own risks in the long run and might threaten the security of that state in various ways.

In this connection, Barry Buzan, founder of the Copenhagen School of security studies, states that foreign, military and economic policies of states, the junction of these policies in areas of conflict, and the general composition of relations which they cause, are all studied with regard to national and international security (Buzan, 1983: 3). Thus; according to him, security studies should not only focus on the military sphere, but also involve societal, environmental, economic, and political spheres (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 135).

Security is not a simple and unidimensional area; instead, it is rather complex and multi-dimensional depending on the threat. According to Huysmans, security spectrum is an inter-agency mode of policy-making that enables the transfer of the security reminiscence of terrorism, narco-trafficking and money-laundering to the area of migration and there are evidences that there is a clear conflux between migration and counter-terrorism practices (Huysman, 2006: 71 and Huysman,

2000: 770). Adding that the perception of threat, according to which security policies are determined, is very much unique and subjective to the time and the states; this issue becomes more and more interconnected. Although the concept of threat has existed and changed for a very long time and during specific cases, the quality of it has started to be discussed in order to find a more common definition since the end of the Cold War. But especially after 9/11, this issue has become more prominent in the agenda of the countries' fight against terrorism, and the concept of threat has become highly interrelated with the "others". In addition to 9/11, when illegal migration rates reached to a critical threshold throughout Europe especially after 2015, the challenges of migration and terrorism started to be gradually and rigorously interconnected both in public discourse and on political agendas (DIIS Report, 2017).

If the Syrian case is examined closely, Turkey's situation come to the forefront with many specific and extraordinary aspects. Turkey, in a very short time turned into both a target and a transit country for the Syrians fleeing from the war. With Open Door Policy, namely by lifting up the barriers, people who had no official documents to declare have reached to Turkey by crossing the Syrian border irregularly, and some passed to various countries in illegal ways afterwards. Though there is not a very strong connection, there is a possibility of a connection between the definition of "a person who has nothing to declare" and "a person who has nothing to lose". The increase in the number of these migrants in Turkey has led to a simultaneous increase in social disturbance and caused fears of security both at individual and national level (Erdoğan, 2015: 67-68) which will be exemplified in the following headings.

2. TURKEY'S MIGRATION POLICY AFTER 2011

The alleged risk of immigration on societal security of a country is not an objective and worldwide threat, but rather a subjective one depending on the ways that target country defines (Weiner, 1992-1993: 110). Especially after the migrant waves in the second decade of 2000s, it is possible to claim that this subjective threat gained more supporters than ever.

Turkey, located in a place where Asia, Europe and Africa approach each other the closest, is on significant migration routes and thus, has witnessed major immigration flows. Since 2000s, the increase in the migration rate in the rest of the world has also affected Turkey significantly and Turkey found itself again at the centre of an intense human mobility and circulation (Kara & Korkut, 2010: 27). Besides, immigration classifications have become assorted since 2000s and Turkey

started to receive several types of immigrants such as irregular migrants, asylum seekers, transit migrants, refugees, and regular migrants (İçduygu & Aksel, 2015: 131). This intensity continued to increase especially until 2011 and reached to a completely different dimension after 2011 when Syrian migration crisis started.

Unlike other Middle Eastern countries, Ba'ath regime's harsh attitude towards popular uprisings has brought about many internal conflicts in Syria. While there was a huge sum of fatalities in Syria due to civil war, an important portion of them chose to migrate to various countries, especially to neighbouring countries, to ensure security (Quinn, 2016: 277). While having been a transit country as well, Turkey still hosts the biggest Syrian population within its borders.

The reaction against migration flows have always been double edged: on the one hand, migration is seen as a security threat to the identity and culture of the host country; on the other hand, migration is seen as a humanitarian responsibility to offer international protection for the people in need of it (Njaim, 2018: 30). In addition to responsibilities derived from international law, Turkey's approach to migration that stemmed from the internal disorder in Syria was humanitarian from the very beginning, which was well proved by the Open Door Policy. However, especially after intensified terrorist attacks coming from the other side of the borders in the years of 2015 and 2016, the security dimension of migration topped the agenda.

At this point, it is necessary to mention a common misconception especially in the media, among the public, and sometimes even in the state authorities. Turkey, which is a party to the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, has kept refugee status limited to the European region (Danıştay, 1951). So that, Syrians are granted temporary protection status, not refugee status[1]. In October 2011, Minister of Interior declared at a UNHCR-hosted conference in Geneva that Turkey was enforcing a temporary protection arrangement for the Syrians roughly modelled by the EU Temporary Protection Directive (Olejarova, 2018: 121). However; temporary protection in Turkey was not built on any present law, it was an *ad hoc* measure of which fulfillment relied upon political and administrative discernments (Olejarova, 2018: 121). It was formalized under the name of "Temporary Protection Regulation" on 22 October 2014. According to this regulation, the status is applied to foreigners who;

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[1] In this study, the terms of "Syrians", "refugees", "asylum seekers", "(illegal) migrants" and "immigrants" -when it comes to Syrians- are referring to the "Syrians fleeing from the instability and violence in Syria" regardless of their legal conceptual contexts.

- were forced to leave their country,

- cannot return to the country they left,

- arrived at or crossed Turkish borders in masses or individually,

- will not have their international protection needs adjudicated under an individual procedure (RRT, 2017).

2.1. Open Door Policy

As being a party to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (with geographical limitations though), European Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention against Torture; Turkey, opened its borders to the victims of the Syrian civil war both within international obligations and humanitarian responsibilities. According to Turkey, the Assad regime was about to end and relying on this prospect, Turkey announced Open Door Policy for the Syrians who flee from the conflict (Kirişçi, 2014: 1). It was provision of admittance to Turkish territory for anyone coming from Syria, even for the ones who lack required documentation like identification or passport (Tolay, 2016: 140). This policy ensures respect for the principle of non-refoulment and undertaking of the Turkish government to offer optimum standard of living and humanitarian assistance for the refugees (Kirişçi, 2013).

While Turkey's earliest response was built on short run emergency program intending to provide accommodation and food for the Syrians, Turkey has since revised its plan according to the upcoming conditions as the conflict spun out (Kanat et al. 2015: 11). Within few years, the numbers of the Syrians increased from thousands to millions. Especially after 2015, the wave of migration turned into an irrepressible issue for the region and Europe. It is important to remember that Turkey is faced with mass immigration emerging due to political and security reasons (Günay et al., 2017: 54) and the number of migrants, which was 4.9 million between 2000 and 2011, is 9.7 million in 2019 and 3.6 out of which are Syrians; a proportion of 4.5% of the total population (UNHCR, 2019). This rate is also quite important for the EU countries as a good number of the refugees see Turkey as a transit country and aim to go to Europe for either social or economic purposes. Thus, Europe faces a serious wave of uncontrolled migration as well. While other neighbouring countries -Jordan and Lebanon- gave up their open door policies; European countries who were once experienced the pride of folding arms to refugees, specifically Sweden and Germany, began launching restrictions for the refugees trying to enter their territories (Tolay, 2016: 140). 2015 and 2016 are very

important years in this aspect; they were the years of peak in irregular migration rates towards Europe, the years Turkey was dealing with increasing Syria originated security problems and also the years negotiations started with Turkey and the EU regarding the Syrians in Turkey. Though the reaction of the EU towards refugee flow was mute until 2015, they started to convert this policy when Syrians started to knock the doors of the EU states and the number of refugees severely raised and reached to a point where they could no longer be absorbed by Turkey (Paçacı Elitok, 2019: 1). From June to November, almost 704,000 irregular migrants, predominantly the Syrians, arrived in Greece by sea from Turkey (UNHCR, 2016b) which increased the bipartite strain on Turkey to restrict the movement of Syrians within and from Turkey (Memişoğlu and Ilgıt, 2017). As a conclusion, Readmission Agreement was signed between Turkey and the EU on March 18, 2016 to end this flow and better manage the process by proclaiming Turkey as a buffer zone (Aydın, 2018: 36).

Following these developments, in addition to the increasing criminal and terrorist activities coming from the other side of the Syrian border which will be explained in details below, an apparent revision was made in border policies. Turkey *de facto* ended Open Door Policy after 2016 and started to build a wall that exceeds 900 km along its Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian borders in order to both combat terrorism and reduce irregular migration (Erdoğan, 2019a: 3). By the year 2017, while the number of refugees who came to Greece via Turkey fell by 97 percent compared to the period before the agreement (EC, 2019); Turkey's security problems increased and among 19 crossing points between Syria and Turkey; 13 were closed, 3 were restricted and 3 remained open (OCHA, 2017).

3. A CASE STUDY: TURKEY AS THE MOST-SYRIAN-HOSTING COUNTRY IN THE WORLD

As mentioned previously, one of the most affected countries by the crisis that began in 2011 is Turkey. It hosts about 3.7 millions of Syrians out of 5.7 million who left their country, which means Turkey hosts 3 out of every 5 refugees in the world (UNHCR, 2019). At the beginning, Syrians were generally settled in temporary protection centres or in the cities near border; however, with the continuing and increasing flow of migrants and with changing perception from temporariness through permanence, Syrians started to spread to every part of Turkey. The following map shows the distribution of Syrian immigrants in top ten hosting cities in Turkey:

Figure-1. *Distribution of Syrians Under Temporary Protection by Province of First Ten as of January 2020. (DGMM, 2020).*

As can be seen from the map, 2/3 of the Syrians are hurdled in these ten cities of Turkey. In some of the cities, the population of the Syrians are much higher than the total population of most of other cities in Turkey. An in depth analysis is also important as numbers solely would not reflect the facts properly. When the situation is handled from this aspect, it is seen that, in Kilis for example, where local community is almost becoming minority (Hoffman et al. 2016: 8), the ratio of the Syrians in total population is more than 80%, which corresponds to a risk at the construction of urban harmony and consistence. Urban harmony is very much important both in the establishment of security and the creation of the sense of security in the eyes of the public. From capacities of healthcare services to schools, from supply balance of the provisions to cultural familiarities; any kind of abrupt difference in the usual harmony of a place might become a major problem in time if necessary measures are not taken. As highlighted in UNHCR report, basic needs like healthcare could be of a sudden point for conflict and social tensions (UNHCR, 2016a: 70). Furthermore; the resources Kilis received from the central budget remained same in 2011 and 2017, despite the fact that the province were hosting a huge number of Syrians as high as the local population (The Ombudsman Institution, 2018: 167), social situation in Kilis becomes clearer. The security side of migration crisis not only contains general border security threats for Turkey but also has the dimension of subsequent public security threats.

3.1. Border Security

States and rulers consider the capacity to figure out who enters and stays within their borders as a touchstone of their sovereignty, but it was not until lately that the border turned out to be the line at which admission could be granted or refused, depending on the documents provided (Carr, 2013). Borders have always been the main factor in ensuring the security of a country in this regard. This factor is of vital importance for Turkey as well, as having inherited the lands that host migrants for thousands of years apart from the invaders who were attracted by the strategic importance of its location. As a matter of fact, border security comes first in terms of security of both domestic and foreign policy for such a country.

Both the war in Syria and migration wave to Turkey, which is seen as the safest place by Syrians, have seriously affected Turkey's border security (Uzman, 2016: 135). This is because, members of terrorist groups, notably ISIS, who have entered into the country illegally from the border together with the Syrian refugees, have caused the terrorist permeability to increase. This permeability has brought about increased terrorist attacks in the country. Due to very long borders, necessary controls might not be sufficient all the time and the border policy formed in theory might contain too many deficiencies in practice. According to the figures given by the General Staff, from January 1, 2011 to June 9, 2016; 45,921 illegal entries, 16,957 smuggling activities and a total of 78,011 border incidents including 5,796 exits were detected and 397,216 persons were captured (refugees are not included) (Uzman, 2016: 156).

Border security is an important aspect in establishing public security within the territories of the country as borders are generally supposed to be the first frontiers against external threats. An uncontrolled migration crisis or a poorly planned open door policy might well lead to the illegal entrance of the members of the terrorist organizations into the country. Refugee channels are the perfect paths for people of having different or illegal purposes from different sects and nationalities as well. Many ISIS militants from different nationalities have been caught by Turkish security forces while crossing the border from Syria to Turkey. Especially following the terrorist attacks in the year 2015 and 2016, Turks increasingly began to associate refugees with violence, not because refugees themselves were perpetrators but because the refugee flow seemingly demonstrated that Turkey had lost control of its southern border (Makovsky, 2019). According to a public opinion survey held by Metropoll in 2019; %75,2 of the Turkish citizens disagree with the Syrian refugee policy, %71,1 believes that cities became unsafe due to Syrians, %72,8 thinks that Syrians badly affect Turkish economy (Yayan, 2019). In this

field, an overall study was conducted by Erdoğan who carries out an extensive research at regular intervals of which latest was published in 2020. According to him; the concerns in Turkish society towards Syrians tend to increase at all propositions; while the average anxiety level was %3,22 out of 5 in 2017, this increased to %3,58 in 2019 (Erdoğan, 2019b: 81). First of the most serious concerns for Syrians in Turkish society is the thought of "getting harmed" by Syrians and second one is the thought that Syrians disturb the general peace by involving in crimes such as violence, theft, smuggling and prostitution (Erdoğan, 2019b: 82).

Apart from increasing tensions among Turkish citizens due to a rapid and unforeseen increased Syrian population, there rises another aspect of Open Door Policy. This policy was perceived, in a sense, as an opportunity for most of the terrorist organisations, more so ISIS, involved in a number of terrorist attacks in a very short time. Claiming that they were doing their actions on behalf of Islam, they tried to expand their domain through religion. Starting their actions in Iraq and Syria, they expanded their field of action over time and organized different terrorist attacks in different countries. But the only risk group stemming from Syrian crisis was not ISIS for Turkey. Armed groups linked to the pro-Assad regime's secret service el-Muheberat, other regional and international terrorist organizations including al-Nusra or PYD/YPG have been threats for Turkey's security. As conflicts increased between armed groups in Syria, Turkey had to launch military operations after 2016 in Syria in order to build and keep its own national security. Below are some examples of terrorist attacks that led the way for Turkey to restrict border entries, launch military operations in Syria and *de facto* end Open Door Policy.

On 11 February 2012, a bomb-loaded with Syria licenced plate car was blasted at Cilvegözü border check-point, as a result of which 18 people died and 24 people were injured; it was announced that the attack was organized by two Syrian nationals associated with pro-Assad regime's secret service (AA, 2017). Another terrorist attack in Turkey, coming beyond Syrian borders, was on 11 May 2013, in Hatay – Reyhanlı. As a result of detonation of the vehicle loaded with bombs, 52 people died and 146 people were injured in two separate attacks (Arı et al., 2016: 203) and 1.200 working places were damaged (AA, 2013). Weeks before the attack, on 23 April 2013, the National Intelligence Organization, had declared that 3 cars were loaded with bombs in the Syrian city of Rakka and the suspects were planning to attack Turkey and the bombers probably used three of the border crossings in Gaziantep, Sanliurfa and Hatay (Kızılkoyun, 2013). After the attack,

Turkish Minister of Interior stated they confirmed the organization and individuals responsible for the lethal explosions were associated with pro-Syrian administration groups and the intelligence organizations in Syria (World Bulletin, 2013).

Another attack took place on 20 March 2014 in Ulukışla conducted by the members of the ISIS in Niğde against the Gendarmerie and Security units during the road safety and control check. Two security officials and one Turkish citizen lost their lives, seven officials from the Security forces and one Turkish citizen were injured (MoI, 2017a:32). As a result of the grenade attack conducted on 6 January 2015, again by ISIS, against the İstanbul Province Governorship – Sultanahmet Directorate of Tourism Office, 2 police officers were injured and 1 police officer was killed (MoI, 2017a:35). In another suicide attack of a member of ISIS of Syrian national, conducted in Istanbul on 10 January 2016; thirteen people lost their lives in total, including the suicide bomber and sixteen people were injured (MoI, 2017a:36). On 28 June 2016, three separate suicide attacks were carried out in the International Terminal of İstanbul Atatürk Airport, by the members of the ISIS terrorist organization, as a result of which, forty eight people lost their lives and two hundred forty people were injured (MoI, 2017a:37). 2 months later, on 20 August 2016, another devastating attack was carried out at a wedding ceremony in Gaziantep resulting in death of 56 people. This suicide attack was organized by a Syrian national under the instruction of the so-called Emir of ISIS (Hürriyet, 2016). Same year on 10 October, at an operation to a cell house of ISIS in Gaziantep, 3 police officers were killed and 8 people were injured by suicide bomber ISIS militants, and on 4 November in Diyarbakır a bomb attack was organized as a result of which 2 police officers and 9 people were killed and both ISIS and TAK (Teyrebazen Azadiya Kurdistan) claimed the attack (Yeşiltaş et al., 2016: 28-30). On 1 January 2017, a member of ISIS, who had entered to Turkey from eastern borders illegally, attacked Reina night club in Istanbul and 39 people, including 1 police officer, lost their lives and 95 people were injured (MoI, 2017a:38). Apart from these cases many other attacks were held in Ankara, İstanbul, Adana, Kilis, Mersin, Diyarbakır and many other cities, leaving hundreds of people and security officers killed by the ISIS or other terrorist organizations originating from Syria. It was clear that the terrorists used the open borders of Turkey to organize the attack in Turkey. This bloody attack proved how important it was to well-protect and control the borders in a very serious way for the first time after Open Door Policy.. It was clear that the terrorists used open borders of Turkey to organize the attack in Turkey. This bloody attack proved how important it was to

well-protect and control the borders in a very serious way for the first time after Open Door Policy.

Furthermore, security problems do not always have to be direct. Conflicts between terrorist groups on the other side of the borders also affect Turkish territories. For example in 2012, a mortar shell hit Akçakale in Turkey from Tel Abyad while Assad regime's army and oppositions were in armed conflict and as a result 5 people were killed, 10 people were injured (Gök, 2019: 91).

These attacks are important in detecting the threat of terrorism by terrorist groups who take the opportunity of the instability in Syria and the gap in border security, particularly to understand how to establish a sense and perception of public security in the eyes of Turkish citizens who link refugee and terrorism in every other terror attack. Terror attacks are actions taken to create maximum negative psychological impact on the target population in whole (Arı et al., 2016: 203). Based on this fact, it would not be wrong to claim that uncontrolled and poorly planned migration wave, when combined with slacks on border security; directly and deeply affects both the border security of the state and, as a consequence of it, the physical and psychological safety of the citizens.

3.2. Internal Security

Internal security has many dimensions like public, economic, social or cultural securities. It is an important fact that Syrian immigrants who settled in Turkey, cause some major problems in terms of socio-demographic, cultural, economic, political and policing / security issues (Kızmaz, 2018: 397). For instance, the number of Syrians in cities is not stable, and the birth rates among Syrians increase simultaneously with new migration flows which cause worries in the hosting society. From 2011 until 2019, the number of Syrian babies born in Turkey is around 516,000 (TRT, 2019) which is much more than the number of total Syrians in many European countries. This shows us the number of Syrians is not only increased by migration, but through new born as well as which poses a demographic threat to national security by means of cultural and social inconsistency. The more the increase in the number of the refugees, the more (the feeling of) the burden is on host communities. Social institutions of a country which the citizens benefit are planned and designed according to the needs of that society. When the first lot of the Syrians came to Turkey, it is usually stated by the policy makers that it was an emergency and Syrians are being hosted temporarily. With the passage of time, public started to question the term of emergency as the instability in Syria went into tenth year as of 2020. Many of the Turkish citizens believe that Syrians put an extra burden on social services and cause problems in

making use of public services (Tunç, 2015: 35). This demographic threat not only affects social services but also leads to a public anxiety and a perception of security threat in various fields. In a study compiled by conducting interviews from 134 different business circles in 18 provinces, it was found that approximately 90% of the interviewers have security concerns originating from Syrian refugees (Erdoğan, 2015: 67-68). These concerns could be summarized as follows:

• it may increase crimes such as theft, pickpocketing, gang wars and extortion,
• they may be involved in terrorist acts in the future (that may include Syrian regime agents, ISIS militants or other radical organizations among those entering the country),
• the young population may tend to radicalize in the future,
• xenophobia may increase among local people,
• the prostitution sector and related mafia-type activities may increase due to unemployment and poverty,
• conflicts may increase due to cultural differences between migrants and local people,
• Syrians may be abused by some religious, political and underground structures / groups of Syrians in the country (Erdoğan et al., 67-68).

With such a high number of refugees being located inside Turkey, the perception that migrants have a criminal tendency as they have less to lose is also valid for Syrians (Kızmaz, 2018: 409). It is possible to examine the data in more details in the table below:

Table-1. Data on Crimes Committed by Syrian Immigrants and Local People (MoI, 2017b).

Judicial Case	2014	2015	2016	2017 (First 6 months)
Turkey in General	1.870.374	1.858.120	1.876.816	956.306
Syrian Migrants	10.352	13.557	14.457	7.157

As official data is not available after 2017, it is not possible to make a concrete an overall assessment .However, it is clear that these numbers only refer to the cases that were legally registered. Based on the table, it is possible to claim that, as

the population increases, the rate of Syrian involvement in crime increases. When we consider the number of the Syrians in the year 2014, which corresponds to 1,519.286 (DGMM, 2020), less than half of today's numbers; it is easily concluded that the judicial cases increased swiftly.

Besides, the influx also threatens the cultural identity of an existing society which results in having a political constituency demanding migratory restrictions (Buzan, 1991: 447). Cultural identity is composed of a common language and common values which are shared by the majority of the community and what creates the sense of unity in a community. The increasing percentage of the Syrians in Turkey is a threatening factor in the phenomenon of common identity as a completely new culture from language to dressing style is seen everywhere around. The number of the Syrians in Turkey today is almost one fifth of the total population of Syria in 2011[2], the year that civil war erupted. This much newcomers from the same source in such a short period is naturally difficult to be absorbed within the hosting community. According to Erdoğan's survey; the ratio of Turkish people stating that "Syrians do not resemble us in cultural means on any account " increased from %80,2 in 2017, to %81,9 in 2019 (Erdoğan, 2020: 61).

Another aspect of internal security is the economic security of the citizens. Though there are positive aspects of migrants to the economy, like mushrooming new business areas or raising productivity; there are also negative effects. In October 2019, Berat Albayrak, the Minister of Treasury and Finance, declared that Turkey had spent more than $ 40 billion for the Syrian refugees and Syria related terrorism threats which badly affected Turkey's economy (Sabah, 2019). Taking into consideration that per capita income started to decrease significantly every other year after 2012 (MoC, 2019), the economic burden of the Syrians on the shoulders of the citizens should be re-evaluated.

According to Hikmet Çinçin, President of Chamber of Trade and Industry of Antakya, Turkey's exports from Hatay to Syria were $ 123 million in 2008, $ 186 million in 2009, $ 250 million in 2010, $ 150 million in 2011, but almost zero in 2012 (Ezer, 2012). Syria was also a transit pass for Turkish exports to the Gulf countries and closure of official land-trade routes led up to formation of illegal passages and raise in organized crime activities in the region (Olejarova, 2018: 127). According to data of the General Staff, between the years 2011 and 2016, total 5,516.875 litres of fuel, 22,818.330 packs of cigarettes, 4,242.478 grams of drugs and 1,667.971 narcotic pills, 86,903 live animals, 3,746 pieces of weapons

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[2] According to data from the World Bank, the population of Syria was 21,082.966 in 2011 (WB, 2011).

and 7,048 mobile phones were seized at Syrian borders (Uzman, 2016: 156). Smuggling goods from Syria into Turkey became a prominent concern as a result of ISIS and other factions seizing control over hydrocarbon production in parts of Syria, which is estimated to provide ISIS $ 2 million per day (GRI, 2015). Bringing counterfeit American and Turkish currency from Syria into Turkey is another type of smuggling and in February 2015, Turkey's largest anti-counterfeit dollar operation of a decade were recorded which netted $ 11 million fake money and two Syrian nationals were arrested (GRI, 2015). Apart from these, constructing illegal pipelines underground in order to move gasoline from Syria to Turkey is also an area for terror organizations to make money. ISIS constructed illegal pipelines to refine gasoline from territories under its control to Turkey and as a consequence of the spread of gas smuggling networks, 50 million litres of contraband gasoline were impounded by Turkish security forces in 2014 (GRI, 2015).

One other aspect of economic security is the black economy. Most of the Syrians have no work permit in Turkey as the laws dictate that foreigners need to have a valid passport and a residence permit to work. However, this does not stop most of the Syrians to search the ways for earning money even under illegal conditions. Apart from influencing the resource allocation negatively, leading child labour, causing unfair competition, erosion in social security system and misevaluation of the economic data increasing unrecorded employment rates of the migrants also suppresses the justice of taxation and decreases the income from taxes; which in the end, returns to the hosting community as superimposed load both socially and economically.

CONCLUSION

The globalisation has eased the international migration which has become a reality, reaching nearly all corners of the globe. (UN, 2017) The fact that millions of Syrians left their countries due to ongoing war in Syria caused an uncontrolled migration wave in many parts of the world, especially in the Middle East and Europe, which has brought a different dimension to the phenomenon of migration. As migration issue has two folds of humanitarian and security, many countries have a dilemma in developing policies towards increasingly growing migration. The wave of migration has forced or enabled not only Syrians, but also people of various nationalities to enter target territories easily. In 2015, Europe received approximately 1.3 million asylum applications, half of which were Syrians and the other half were from Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and other countries (DIIS Report, 2017). Furthermore; given that in 2015 almost three-quarters of all deaths from terrorism globally took place in these countries of origin, a clear connection can

already be made between the activities of terrorist organizations and the refugee situation (DIIS Report, 2017). In the following years after 2016; due to Readmission Agreement, there has been a significant decrease in the numbers (Eurostat, 2020).

Turkey, who handled the situation from mostly humanitarian perspective until 2016, started to revise its border policies, especially after the repeated terrorist attacks stemmed from the Open Door Policy. States have interests (and responsibilities) in controlling their territorial borders for various reasons, such as providing the control over their populations, limiting access to labour markets and public goods, and sustaining internal security (Adamson, 2006). When the borders are removed or opened in an uncontrolled way, some of the objectives of the state for the establishment of internal security are also eliminated automatically. Receiving anyone who, naturally, has no official documents to declare to a country, contains all kinds of risks both for the hosting state and its communities. As mentioned above; though there is not a very strong connection, there is a possibility of a connection between the definition of "a person who has nothing to declare" and "a person who has nothing to lose".

While border security measures aim to stop threats before it reaches the territories of the state; internal, societal and public security measures aim to protect the interest and to establish the safety of the citizens in social, cultural and economic means. It would be too optimistic to think that such a large proportion of Syrians scattered randomly all over Turkey's territory would not affect the social, cultural, economic and demographic structure; because it is inevitable that such a situation might create a security vulnerability. From this point of view a broader approach of national security is also needed to be included in migration policies.

When all these facts are taken into account, it might be stated that Turkey, having inherited the legacy of humanity from its history, does not stay back when it comes to a humanitarian issue. While people are trying to flee from a war; but under responsibilities of the international and humanitarian perspective, it is impossible to stay back and watch people die. However, on the other hand, it is not possible to claim that the humanitarian policies do not possess any kinds of security threat within. Un- and under-controlled wave of migration conceives of such a result at any moment. Therefore, migration policies should be well planned and designed as long-term policies regading the social dimension and related security concerns.

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